Abstract. In recent years, China has continuously deepened economic system reform. As the reform of mixed ownership was carried out, corporate governance research has became better, and the management shareholding got more and more attention. In this paper, based on the sample of Chinese listed companies between 2011 and 2015, it is found that there is no significant effect on the shareholding of management in the mixed ownership enterprise. The positive correlation effect of the equity incentive to the state-owned enterprise is slightly more than that of the private enterprise. Aiming at the conclusion of the study, the reasons were analyzed and some suggestions were put forward.
I. Introduction
While China is still in the primary stage of socialism, the basic national conditions of our country determine the basic economic system of the public ownership as the main body, coexistence of various forms of ownership. In order to better achieve the socialist market economy, China's positive develop, and constantly deepen the reform of mixed ownership. The decision of the CPC Central Committee on major issues concerning comprehensively deepening the reform points the mixed ownership economy is an important realization form of the basic economic system. The positive development of the mixed ownership economy is the necessary requirement to deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and improve the basic economic system.
Modern enterprise system makes the separation of management and operation rights, and the inconsistency of the interests of shareholders and management results in the Principal agent problem. In order to alleviate the agency cost and realize the great development of the enterprise, it is necessary to keep the interests of management and shareholder in line-equity incentive.
Managerial ownership, can effectively avoid short-term management problems, and promote the management to make policy of increasing the value and long-term development of the company. In recent years there have been few studies of the equity incentive status between mixed ownership companies and non mixed ownership. The purpose of this paper is to study the main problems and issues related to quantitative -whether there is a difference between the ownership incentive effect of mixed ownership companies and non mixed ownership companies. In the study of this paper, we hope that through the discussion of the above issues, we can sort out the development of the mixed ownership system in China's listed companies, to understand the current situation of the development of management shareholding, and to provide suggestions for future reform.
II. Research Review
The academic circles have made massive research to the management ownership, and the results show the diversification tendency. Abroad, Demsetz (1985) and Cho (1998) did not find a correlation between management ownership and corporate performance [1, 2] . And Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) using a piecewise regression research methods, found that when the proportion of executives shareholding lied between 0% and 5% or greater than 5%, the enterprise's Tobin Q value is positively correlated, while in the 25% -5% range, Tobin Q value is negatively correlated [3] . Chen (2003) found that the management ownership and the company's value were positively correlated through the study of 123 Japanese companies [4] . Short and Keasey investigated the British companies to assess the relationship between the performance and management ownership, and found that the relationship curves [5] . MeConnell and Servaes have verified the curve relation between Tobin Q and company internal shareholders ownership by empirical analysis. When the internal shareholders holds less than 50% or 40%, they are in the same direction of change, but when internal shareholders holds more than the proportion of the boundaries, they have a reverse change relationship. [6] In China, Zengquan Li (2000) found that executive ownership and corporate performance is not relevant through the research of management ownership, managers' annual salary and corporate performance [7] . Liangliang Han (2006) , with 78 private enterprises as the research model, explored the influence of management ownership through the Tobin Q value, and found that there is a significant nonlinear relationship between management ownership and corporate value [8] . Zhiying Cheng (2012) suggested that the relationship between management ownership and corporate value was nonlinear, but promoted the corporate performance positively on the whole [9] .
In view of China's national conditions, it is necessary to study the management ownership of the mixed ownership system with Chinese characteristics.
III. The Development of Mixed Ownership System in Our Country
China's emergence and development of mixed ownership economy mainly due to the reform of state-owned enterprises, the search for the combination of state ownership and market economy in the form and way. The understanding of the mixed ownership is constantly deepening, and China has held several meetings in order to introduce the mixed ownership structure reasonably.
In 1997, the fifteen Congress of the Communist Party of China proposed to continue to adjust and improve ownership structure, and public ownership economy includes not only the state-owned economy and collective economy, but also state-owned and collective-owned elements in the mixed ownership economy. In 1999, large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises especially competitive enterprises were permitted transformed into joint-stock enterprises and develop the mixed ownership economy. In 2002, except a very small number of enterprises owned by the state owned enterprises, it is necessary to actively implement the joint stock system and develop a mixed ownership economy. In 2003, the mixed ownership economy has been attached importance, and became the main form of public ownership. The third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee held in 2013 proposed to allow more state-owned economy and other ownership economy to develop into a mixed ownership economy. In 2015, many opinions and suggestions were proposed in the file Opinions of the State Council on the development of mixed ownership economy in state owned enterprises which elaborate the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises.
China has basically established the direction and status of the development of mixed ownership economy through a thorough discussion of the meeting. The reform of the mixed system is constantly improved, but there is still a certain gap to achieve the target of the socialist market economy. To this end, it is necessary to stimulate the vitality of the mixed ownership companies and improve the economic efficiency. The following will discuss the impact of the current management ownership on the company's operations, hoping to promote the company's reform, and the further development of the national economy.
IV. The Status Quo of Management Ownership of Mixed Ownership Companies in China
Through the selection and analysis of the data of listed companies from 2011 to 2015, this paper makes a statistical analysis on the status quo of management shareholding of mixed ownership companies in China to understand the development of management shareholding in China under the current mixed ownership system. General situation. In this part, the present situation of management shareholding is described and explained by studying the data of stock ownership incentive of executives in China in the past five years. The study takes Chinese Listed Companies in 2011-2015 as the research sample, and in accordance with the following methods to select the samples: (1) excluding the company of missing data; (2) excluding the company with poor management. Table 2 , we can see that the difference of Mean value and Standard deviation of the two groups of companies is more significant in 2001 and 2013, and the standard deviation of the companies which do not implement the equity incentive is significantly higher than that of the other companies. The standard deviation and the mean is not a big difference in the remaining three years, and the standard deviation of the companies which implement the equity incentive is slightly higher than that of the other companies. From Table 3 , we can see most years of the ROA of state-owned enterprises are higher than of private enterprises except the year of 2013. And only in 2013 the ROA is relevant.
In listed companies, the performance (ROA) of companies that implement equity incentive in mixed ownership companies and non mixed ownership companies does not appear significant difference. Thus, Management shareholding (equity incentive for executives) is one of the factors that affect the operation of the company, but the effect is not significant. In the comparative analysis of the nature of the company, the state-owned and private enterprises in the implementation of equity incentives in the company's performance comparison did not show significant differences. The positive effect of equity incentive on state-owned enterprises is slightly more obvious than that of private enterprises.
VI. Possible Reason Analysis and Suggestion
Possible reason analysis 1. The increase in non salary income of executives that due to the unsoundness of corporate governance and supervisory mechanism dilutes the effect of equity incentive, making the results of the comparative study do not show significant differences. Zhiying Cheng (2012) pointed out executives control over the company, so they can benefit through a variety of means, resulting equity incentive is not valued [9] .
2. Equity incentive is a long-term plan, its effect is not immediately apparent, so regarding the existing sample time and research methods, it is difficult to estimate whether equity incentive plays a due effect.
3. This study regards ownership as an exogenous variable, only to measure the results of whether to hold equity under different constraints, rather than the effect of our assumptions on the impact of ownership. Jianwen Wang (2010) mentioned that there may be interactive between management ownership and corporate performance [10] .
4. Different measures may lead to different research results. The influence of the selection of indicators can not be ignored.
Suggestion
Many researches at home and abroad support the management ownership to promote long-term development of enterprises. So aiming at incentive effect is not significant in the mixed ownership, we put forward the following countermeasures.
1. Internally, to spur executives to enhance the value of the enterprise, it's necessary to perfect the corporate governance structure of the mixed ownership enterprises, optimize the ownership structure, give full play to the role of the board, and strengthen supervision. Research of Wei'an Li (2006) on the management ownership also made that clear [11] .
2. Externally, to play the effectiveness of equity incentives, a task of top priority is to regulate the external governance environment, improve the relevant laws and regulations of corporate governance, perfect the manager evaluation system and enhance the effectiveness of the capital market.
3. A reasonable compensation system should be linked to corporate performance, combining short-term and long-term incentive, and improve the understanding of equity incentive that is regarded as the product of the long-term development of executives and enterprises not merely as a means of increasing executive compensation. Yanping Li (2008) proposed under the premise of ensuring the annual salary system, to inspire executives make the best performance for sustained growth, gradually increasing the proportion of shareholding executives is feasible [12] .
